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“Good experience with citric acid. Next opportunity [vitamin] B2. We
think it’s worth that we explore all possibilities of cooperation. Let’s explore
cooperation product-by-product.” (Kuno Sommer, Hoffmann-La Roche,
quoted in New York Times 10/10/99)
1 Introduction
This paper studies the potential of leniency - respectively amnesty - programs allowing
for Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus to create incentives for companies, which are simul-
taneously participating in multiple cartel activities, to reveal the entire range of their
antitrust offenses.
Experience garnered over many years has taught antitrust authorities in the United
States (US) and the European Union (EU) that companies which have been colluding in
one specific product or geographic market are more likely to have engaged in, or at least
to know about, cartel activities in other adjacent markets. Due to the high diversity of
businesses in multinational firms, price fixing and market allocation conspiracies bear
all the marks of contagion between and especially within companies. The cross-linked
conspiracy pattern in various vitamins, citric acid and lysine is a well-known subject
matter and illustrates this claim: During ten years, Hoffmann-La Roche (HLR) was
simultaneously active in virtually all cartels affecting the whole extent of bulk vitamin
production, i.e. vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B5, B6, folic acid, C, D3, H, beta carotene
and carotinioids. The first main group of cartels consisted of price fixing agreements
in the markets for vitamin A and E between HLR, BASF and Rhoˆne-Poulenc. The
initial success of these arrangements inspired their replication in other vitamin markets.
In these second-wave cartels, firms such as Merck, Takeda and Daiichi, simultaneously
colluding in at least one other vitamin, joined the pioneers (Connor, 2000). While Rhoˆne-
Poulenc’s disclosure of evidence on collusion in the vitamin A and E markets made the
cartel’s wall of silence crumble, only BASF’s comprehensive collaboration with the US
Department of Justice (DoJ) under the Amnesty Plus Program accelerated inquiries and
finally led to the successful prosecution of all participants. Accordingly, the European
Commission (EC) stated that “the simultaneous existence of the collusive arrangements
in the various vitamins was not a spontaneous or haphazard development, but was
conceived and directed by the same persons at the most senior levels of the companies
concerned”1. Surprisingly, when Rhoˆne-Poulenc plead guilty to its vitamin conspiracies
under the US Amnesty Program and applied for leniency under the 1996 EC Leniency
Notice, it pursued cartel activities in methionine and methylglucamine2.
1EC IP/01/1625 November 2001.
2EC IP/01/1625 November 2001, EC IP/02/976 July 2002, EC IP/02/1746 November 2002.
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During the vitamin conspiracy, HLR was acting as a co-leader of the citric acid cartel,
the world’s most widespread acidulent and preservative used in the food and beverage
industry, at the side of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM). In 1997, at the time of HLR’s
conviction under the US antitrust law for its participation in the citric acid conspiracy,
the Division informed the company about the ongoing investigations in the vitamin
market and even asked for its cooperation in return for lenient treatment. However,
instead of assisting the DoJ in its inquiries, not only did HLR’s top executives, engaged
in the citric acid conspiracy and holding at the same time important responsibilities in
the vitamin business, boldly deny any knowledge of, or participation in, a vitamin cartel,
but also they sharply increased their efforts to conceal illegal arrangements (Hammond,
2000; Barboza, 1999). In 1997, shortly after ADM had plead guilty for criminal price
fixing in citric acid, HLR and Jungbunzlauer AG (JBL) agreed to plea-bargain and to
pay fines totaling $25 million. At the same time, ADM and JBL engaged in price fixing
and market sharing in sodium gluconate3.
In 1995, two years before the citric acid cartel was exposed, dawn raids in the head-
quarters of ADM, the largest US processor of agricultural commodities, produced hard
evidence of collusive arrangements in lysine, an essential amino acid. This investigation
directly led to the citric acid cartel when authorities found documents and video tapes
which contained references to the conspiracy in citric acid. The illegal price fixing and
market sharing agreements in lysine4 were initiated by ADM in 1992 and discovered by
the public in 1995 (Connor, 2000). Besides ADM were involved its Asian rivals Aji-
nomoto, Cheil, Kyowa and Sewon. In 1996, the Asian lysine producers plead guilty
and agreed to cooperate with the DoJ and to testify against ADM in return for lenient
treatment. Just after the adoption of the 1996 EC Leniency Notice, Ajinomoto decided
to inform the EC on the cartel and qualified for a 50% discount in fines. At the time
Ajinomoto came forward, it was involved in another global conspiracy in the market for
nucleotides5 lasting until mid 1996 when it was unveiled by its accomplice Takeda, itself
under investigation for participation in the vitamin cartel case.
In the US, convictions of global cartels in the 1990s suggest that at least a dozen
firms have become repeated offenders in related product industries (Connor, 2003). The
DoJ has been investigating around 50 alleged international cartels in 2004, and half of
them have been detected during inquiries on separate markets (Hammond, 2004). These
so-called ‘rolling investigations’ and ‘cartel profiling’ techniques are the DoJ’s response
to companies’ recidivism. With the objective of fully exploiting the multimarket contact
between colluding firms, the DoJ implemented the Amnesty - respectively Penalty - Plus
3EC IP/01/1743 December 2001, IP/01/1355 October 2001.
4EC IP/00/589 June 2000.
5EC IP/02/1907 December 2002.
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Program in 1999 as part of the Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy (Spratling, 1999).
According to Hammond, “The Division’s Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive
inducement for encouraging companies who are already under investigation to report the
full extent of their antitrust crimes [. . .].” (Hammond, 2004:16).
Leniency programs reduce fines for cartel members that bring evidence to the an-
titrust authority. Amnesty refers to the complete exemption from fines. Amnesty Plus
and Penalty Plus comprise proactive strategies aimed at attracting amnesty applications
by encouraging subjects of ongoing investigations to consider whether they qualify for
amnesty in other than currently inspected markets where they engage in cartel activities.
Amnesty Plus offers a firm which currently plea-bargains an agreement for participation
in one illegal antitrust activity, where it cannot obtain guaranteed amnesty, complete
immunity in a second cartel affecting another market. Provided that the firm agrees to
fully cooperate in the investigation of the conspiracy of which the DoJ was previously
not aware, it is automatically granted amnesty for this second offense. Moreover, the
company benefits from a substantial additional discount, i.e. the Plus, in the calculation
of its fine in any plea agreement for the initial matter under investigation6. The coun-
terpart of Amnesty Plus is Penalty Plus, or equivalently “If Amnesty Plus is the carrot,
‘Penalty Plus’ is the stick.” (Jarett Arp and Spratling, 2003:29). If companies that ne-
glect to take advantage of Amnesty Plus are nevertheless caught for a second time, their
behavior is more severely fined than it would otherwise merit. The company’s knowing
failure to report aggravates the punishment, not only increasing the size of the fine but
also the length of the jail sentence for its executives7.
Under the current EC Leniency Notice, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus do not
exist. Although, in 2001, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) recommended the inclusion of Amnesty Plus as part of the 2002 reforms of the
EC Leniency Program, the EC did not seize the opportunity to follow the US example
by introducing a similar policy.
The objective of the analysis is to examine the effect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty
Plus on firms’ initial self-reporting decision, in one market, by altering their whistle-
blowing incentives in another market. Unsurprisingly, conditional on cartel conviction in
6The size of the additional discount mainly depends on three factors: The strength of the evidence
provided by the cooperating company, the potential significance of the revealed case measured in terms
of volume of commerce involved, geographic scope and the number of co-conspirators, and the likelihood
that the DoJ would have detected the cartel absent self-reporting (Hammond, 2006).
7The DoJ does not state an exact percentage increase in the case of Penalty Plus but asserts to
pursue a fine or jail sentence at or above the upper end of the Guidelines Range (Hammond, 2006).
An example of Penalty Plus is the DoJ’s fining decision in monochloracetic acid in 2003. The German
company Hoechst AG was fined roughly 130% above the minimum guideline fine due to its failure to
report the illegal agreement in monochloracetic acid at the time it was convicted for its participation in
the sorbates cartel (Hammond, 2004).
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one of the markets, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms’ reporting incentives
in the other market. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous
impact on firms’ incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand,
firms are less willing to denounce a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC Leniency
Program, if this would entail revelation of a second cartel; especially if the latter is very
profitable. In particular, if, by reporting one of their infringements, firms have to sacrifice
sufficiently high expected cartel profits in the other market, Amnesty Plus and Penalty
Plus help to sustain collusion in both markets. Moreover, since the beneficial effect
of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus operates only after a conviction in one market, less
spontaneous reporting may compromise the very functioning of this policy. On the other
hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may also lead to immediate self-reporting in both
markets. Firms, fearing that, after reporting one, their partner reveals the other cartel,
would prefer to forthwith report both cartels. This desirable effect occurs if expected
cartel profits in one market are not sufficient to compensate for forgoing leniency in the
other market. We base our arguments on an analysis of a two-stage game between two
symmetric firms which simultaneously collude in two distinct product markets, say A
and B, and consider the revelation of these cartels taking into account the enforcement
policy of the Antitrust Authority (AA). To act as a benchmark, we initially examine
firms’ reporting incentives under a standard amnesty policy which comprises neither
Amnesty Plus nor Penalty Plus as it currently is in force in the EU. Then, we analyze
how these revelation incentives change under a US style amnesty policy where Amnesty
Plus exists. Finally, we add Penalty Plus and show that not only our results still hold
but also Penalty Plus may even strengthen our findings.
The study of the possible impact of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on firms’ incen-
tives to self-report has been exclusively left to legal scholars. Jephcott (2002) is first to
highlight the lack of an equivalent to the US Amnesty Plus option in the 2002 EC Le-
niency Notice. McElwee (2004) argues that Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus intensify the
‘race to the courtroom’ dynamics8 and thus generate distrust among cartel members.
Moreover, companies volunteering information on their participation in other cartels
during an investigation on a distinct product or geographic market appear to be rare.
This seems especially true for antitrust regimes under which the altruism of companies is
not substantially rewarded. Even though exceptions may occasionally exist9, the author
8Under the US Amnesty Program, only the first reporting firm is eligible to full immunity from
fines. The so-called ‘winner-takes-it-all’ approach sets up a race among firms competing for being first
to denounce the cartel to the AA.
9In the Belgian Beer Brewers’ cartel, Interbrew, one of the colluding companies under investigation,
spontaneously disclosed a simultaneously existing illegal agreement between Luxembourg brewers though
it could not benefit from an additional fine discount in the Belgian Beer market, e.g. for particularly
extensive cooperation, as it would have under US Amnesty Plus (EC IP/01/1739 December 2001, EC
IP/01/1740 December 2001).
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recommends the introduction of a leniency policy similar to the US Amnesty Plus and
Penalty Plus in Europe.
Although the law literature on the subject is burgeoning, to our knowledge, there is
no economic analysis which tries to clarify possible motifs for the EC’s non-adoption of
Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, let alone to model the role of leniency programs when
companies commit multiple antitrust offenses. We take the first step towards filling this
gap in economic theory on leniency programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
economic literature related to our analysis. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4
analyzes the second stage of the revelation game and its equilibrium outcomes. The first
stage of the game is examined in section 5. Section 6 considers Penalty Plus and shows
how it affects our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The enforcement problem we study essentially relates to two different strands of liter-
ature. On the one hand, our paper is embedded in the analysis of how the design of
leniency programs influences the internal stability of collusive agreements involving a
group of violators. On the other hand, our analysis is motivated by the study of how
multimarket contact affects the degree of cooperation among firms.
Our analysis is closest in purpose to current economic leniency literature in that we
attempt to assess how the design of leniency programs affects cartel stability. Recent
academic research - such as Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2006), Harrington (2005), Motta
and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo (2003) - has elaborated on the differences in conception
of leniency programs and their impact on the efficacy of antitrust enforcement10.
Our model differs from previous work, where firms collude in one market only, in
that we consider firms which simultaneously participate in several collusive agreements.
Spagnolo (2003), by modeling harsher fines for recidivist firms, is the only study on
leniency programs which touches upon recidivism. Higher sanctions for recurrent an-
titrust offenders rationalize the use of reduced fine schemes when firms follow an optimal
two-phase punishment. Reporting raises fines and reduces expected profits from further
collusion, limiting the costs firms are willing to incur to punish the whistleblower defect-
ing from the cartel in the first place. However, whereas in our analysis we capture the
idea of recidivism by the firms’ opportunity, following a successful investigation in one
market, to continue price fixing in another market, the author does not consider firms
which simultaneously are involved in multiple cartel activities.
10For an extensive overview of economic literature on leniency programs see Spagnolo (2006).
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Motchenkova and van der Laan (2005) are first to explicitly acknowledge the im-
portance of firms’ multimarket operations within a leniency framework. They use the
multimarket context in order to examine the effectiveness of leniency rules, given that
firms, admitting their collusive conduct, incur costs other than fines. These additional
costs are modeled as the loss in sales in markets, other than the one involved in illegal
behavior, due to negative reputation effects following a cartel conviction. Although in
their model firms operate in several markets, they form a cartel in one market only.
Moreover, the focus of the study is on the strictness of leniency programs reflecting
the likelihood of getting full immunity from fines even in case many firms self-report
simultaneously and hence, it fundamentally differs from ours.
Another noteworthy difference from the above literature is that, in our model, cartels
do not take the form of ongoing criminal relations. This is in line with Feess and Walzl
(2004) who develop a static model to compare leniency policies in the US and the EU11,
and Spagnolo (2000) who examines anticompetitive effects of leniency programs in one-
shot market interactions. Although our model is static, the intuition behind the results
is likely to apply also to dynamic environments.
Finally, most of the leniency literature focuses on the potential of leniency programs
to deter collusion ex ante. We presume that cartels have already been formed and instead
concentrate on the issue of ex post desistance. However, since greater desistance makes
collusion less profitable, desistance is pertinent to deterrence and thereby enhances ex
ante deterrence. This is in line with Harrington (2005).
Our analysis has essentially been inspired by the literature on collusion in a multi-
market context which started with the seminal paper of Bernheim and Whinston (1990).
The authors build on the idea, first raised by Edwards (1955) and further developed in
a finite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that multimarket contact across
firms may foster anticompetitive outcomes. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show that
strategically linking markets weakly increases cartel profits because it slackens the in-
centive constraints that limit firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in settings of
repeated interactions. Their technical result coincides with the intuition that multi-
market contact allows for linkage-induced punishment which can deter deviations from
collusive behavior.
Apart from the main idea of the above studies, namely that multimarket contact
between firms may influence collusive outcomes, the setup of our model is different in
that we abstract from repeated interactions between colluding firms and do not examine
the cartel formation stage of the game. Moreover, in our analysis, multimarket contact
11Feess and Walzl (2004) focus on differences with respect to e.g. the relevance of the amount of
evidence provided in the determination of the fine reductions and the number of firms eligible to leniency.
They do not address the issue of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus.
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alone does not affect collusive behavior. It is Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus which
create the link between firms’ reporting decisions in the markets where they collude.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic Assumptions
We analyze the interaction between two symmetric firms, F1 and F2, which are simul-
taneously engaged in cartel activities in two distinct product markets, A and B, and
which consider the revelation of these cartels taking into account the enforcement activ-
ity of the AA. Markets A and B may differ in size and profitability. We compare firms’
revelation decisions under the EC Leniency and the US Amnesty Program whose sole
difference here is that the latter allows for Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. Amnesty
Plus signifies that a firm which has been caught colluding in one market, either through
reporting of its co-conspirator or through the investigation efforts of the AA, can avoid
the full fine in this market by reporting the remaining cartel in the other market. Penalty
Plus increases the fine for a recidivist firm.
The strictness of the enforcement policy is summarized by independent market-
specific investigation probabilities, qA and qB, with which the AA opens an inquiry
leading to the conviction of colluding firms with certainty12. At the time firms decide to
enter an illegal agreement, they cannot directly observe prevailing investigation proba-
bilities. However, firms conjecture the strictness of the AA’s enforcement policy based
on a market-specific combination of observable variables which determine current an-
titrust policy. Firms’ ex ante conjectures of detection probabilities, q¯A and q¯B, are the
expected values of ex post realizations. As we focus on desistance, we presume that, be-
fore the start of the game, these conjectures are such that firms find it profitable to form
a cartel in each of the markets. However, probabilities of being convicted may change
over time. Potential reasons could be complaints from consumers, employees revealing
information to the AA, a shift in the AA’s budget constraint which affects available
resources and efforts devoted to antitrust enforcement in the different product markets
or simply changes in the way the AA operates. The change in detection probabilities
acts as an exogenous shock on the expected profitability of a cartel and may prompt
firms to reconsider their decision to collude.
Following an increase in detection probabilities, firms simultaneously decide whether
to self-report or not, S, respectively NS, as a function of conviction probabilities, car-
tel profits and fines. Let us denote ΠA, respectively ΠB, the cartel profits in market
12To keep the model simple, we identify investigation and conviction with a single probability. However,
one could introduce uncertainty with respect to the AA’s ability to prove guilty a detected cartel without
affecting the results (see e.g. Motta and Polo (2003)).
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A, respectively B, and ΠN the non-cooperative Bertrand-Nash profit obtained during
compliance with the law in each market. Without loss of generality, we set ΠN = 0 and
assume that ΠA,ΠB > 0.
3.2 Enforcement Choices
The AA commits to its enforcement policy by setting
- the full fine FA, respectively FB, per cartel detected and successfully prosecuted,
imposed on a non-reporting firm. The size of the fine is exogenously given by law.
- the reduced fine for a self-reporting firm equal to 0. Only the first self-reporting
firm is eligible to amnesty. The latecomer pays the full fine. When both firms
report simultaneously, each is first in 50% of the time.
- the increased fine (1 + α)FA, respectively (1 + α)FB, under Penalty Plus where
α > 0. The parameter α reflects the increase in the fine a firm has to pay when
convicted in one market after prior detection in another market.
- the supplementary reduction in fines under Amnesty Plus equal to the entire fine
previously imposed.
3.3 Timing
The model is static. There is only one period which is divided into two stages. Before the
start of the game, at the beginning of period zero, the AA commits to its fining policy. At
the same time, Nature chooses the order in which a possible investigation takes place,
and firms observe this. If no cartel has been reported, the AA first investigates and
discovers A with probability qA before starting an inquiry in B with probability qB.
When forming a cartel, firms conjecture market-specific conviction probabilities q¯A and
q¯B. These conjectures are low enough to make firms collude in both markets. At the
end of period zero, both firms receive market-specific signals which make them revise
their subjective detection probabilities from q¯A,B to qA,B. Subjective probabilities are
identical for both firms. The shift in detection probabilities might make firms consider
whether they wish to spontaneously report one or both cartels to the AA. If qA,B ≤ q¯A,B,
collusion is still profitable and firms have no incentives to desist from cartel activities
by revealing information to the AA. Thus, the only cases relevant to our analysis result
from an investigation probability increase such that qA,B > q¯A,B in at least one of the
markets. Figure 1 shows the time structure of the game.
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Figure 1: Time Line
Stage 1: Revelation Decision in Both Markets. Firms simultaneously decide
whether to report one, both or none of the cartels.
- If both cartels are reported, the AA convicts each cartel with certainty. The
game does not reach stage 2.
- If only one cartel is reported, the AA convicts this cartel with certainty, and
the game moves on to stage 2.
- If firms do not reveal any information, the AA detects the cartel in A with
probability qA, and firms may want to reconsider their decision whether or
not to report the cartel in B. Hence, if the AA convicts the cartel in A,
the game moves on to stage 2. With probability 1 − qA, the cartel in A
remains undetected, and the game does not reach stage 2. In this case, the
AA investigates and detects the cartel in B with probability qB.
Stage 2: Reconsideration of the Revelation Decision. The game only
reaches stage 2 if one of the cartels has survived stage 1. Firms simultaneously de-
cide whether to report the cartel in the market where the AA has not yet launched
an investigation.
- If firms do not report, the AA convicts the cartel with probability qA, respec-
tively qB.
- If at least one of the firms self-reports, the AA convicts the cartel with cer-
tainty.
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4 Reporting Decision in Stage 2
4.1 EC Leniency Program without Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
When analyzing stage 1 in section 5, we will be interested in unilateral deviations from
cooperation. Therefore, we fix the collusive behavior of F1 in stage 1. The game reaches
stage 2 only after one cartel conviction in stage 1 and thus, there are three different
scenarios which lead to stage 2. First, neither firm reports, but the AA investigates and
detects the cartel in A which happens with probability qA. Second, F2 denounces the
cartel in A but keeps secret the cartel in B. Finally, F2 reveals the cartel in B but sticks
to the collusive agreement in A. Proceeding by backward induction, we examine the
normal form of the revelation game in stage 2 after each possible outcome in stage 1.
We only consider pure strategy Nash Equilibria (NE). Both firms reporting constitutes
a NE only if, for given fines and cartel profits, the probability of being convicted in stage
2 exceeds the probability threshold which makes a unilateral deviation from cooperation
just unprofitable. A firm which reports the cartel in stage 2, while its partner adheres
to cooperation, makes zero profits and pays no fine. Thus, the critical investigation
probability is such that the expected profits from the remaining cartel are zero. Figure
2 depicts this situation under the EC Leniency Program.
-
EU
q˜EUA , q˜
EU
B
NS S
qA, qB
Figure 2: Stage 2 Reporting Decisions in the EU
Above the threshold, expected profits in stage 2 are negative, and firms simulta-
neously report the cartel. The outcome (S, S) is the unique NE. However, below the
critical probability, (S, S) and (NS,NS) are both NE, but the latter Pareto dominates
the former. If the game has two NE, firms coordinate on the Pareto dominating outcome
and therefore do not self-report.
To determine the thresholds, we first consider the situation where firms did not
report any of the cartels in stage 1, but the AA detected the cartel in A all the same.
The payoff matrix in Table 1 summarizes the revelation game played in stage 2. F1’s
possible actions are reported vertically, and those of F2 horizontally. Setting ΠN = 0,
the outcome (SB, SB) is the unique NE only if qB > ΠBΠB+FB = q˜
EU
B . Firms may get
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caught in the cartel activity, earn zero profits and pay a fine with a high probability.
Therefore, expected cartel profits are negative which makes a unilateral deviation from
the cooperative NE attractive.
↓ F1, F2 → S NS
S
2ΠN − FA − 12FB
2ΠN − FA − 12FB
2ΠN − FA
2ΠN − FA − FB
NS
2ΠN − FA − FB
2ΠN − FA
ΠN − FA + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
ΠN − FA + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
Table 1: Stage 2 EC Revelation Game after (NSANSB, NSANSB) in Stage 1
Second, consider the payoff matrix in Table 2 which summarizes the revelation game
played in market B in stage 2 after F2 reported the cartel A in stage 1. Again, expected
cartel profits are negative, and the outcome (SB, SB) is the unique NE only if qB >
ΠB
ΠB+FB
= q˜EUB .
↓ F1, F2 → S NS
S
2ΠN − FA − 12FB
2ΠN − 12FB
2ΠN − FA
2ΠN − FB
NS
2ΠN − FA − FB
2ΠN
ΠN − FA + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
ΠN + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
Table 2: Stage 2 EC Revelation Game after (NSANSB, SANSB) in Stage 1
Finally, given that F2 already reported the cartel B in stage 1, the payoff matrix in
Table 3 summarizes the revelation game played in market A in stage 2. The outcome
(SA, SA) is the unique NE only if qA > ΠAΠA+FA = q˜
EU
A .
↓ F1, F2 → S NS
S
2ΠN − FB − 12FA
2ΠN − 12FA
2ΠN − FB
2ΠN − FA
NS
2ΠN − FB − FA
2ΠN
ΠN − FB + qA(ΠN − FA) + (1− qA)ΠA
ΠN + qA(ΠN − FA) + (1− qA)ΠA
Table 3: Stage 2 EC Revelation Game after (NSANSB, NSASB) in Stage 1
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An increase in the fine a non-reporting firm would have to pay in the case of a con-
viction in stage 2 decreases the investigation probability needed to induce self-reporting.
On the contrary, higher cartel profits in stage 2 raise the critical probability thresholds.
4.2 US Amnesty Program with Amnesty Plus
The analysis is analogous to the EU. The same three scenarios in stage 1 lead to stage
2. Each of them involves one cartel conviction in stage 1. However, firms’ payoffs from
unilateral deviations and with them their reporting incentives in each subgame change
with respect to the EU benchmark case. Since Amnesty Plus links markets, the outcome
in market A affects reporting decisions in market B. A firm, once convicted in market
A, has stronger incentives to denounce the cartel in market B to avoid the fine in A.
Thus, the collusive NE is easier to break than under the EU policy where markets are
independent, and where actions taken in one of the markets do not affect firms’ decisions
in the other market. Figure 3 shows the probability thresholds in the US.
-
EU
NS S
qA, qB
US(AP)
q˜USA , q˜
US
B
S∗
Figure 3: Stage 2 Reporting Decisions in the US, Amnesty Plus
Above the critical probability, firms report the cartel in stage 2. The threshold
is lower and thus, the probability range for which the outcome (S, S) is the unique
NE is larger in the US than in the EU. In the region S∗, the EC Leniency Program
would have sustained the cooperative NE whereas in the US, Amnesty Plus offers a
profitable deviation to a firm which has been fined in stage 1. Therefore, conditional
on conviction in stage 1, Amnesty Plus enhances reporting in stage 2. Still, below the
critical probability, firms coordinate on the cooperative outcome and do not report the
remaining cartel.
To compute the thresholds, we first consider the payoff matrix in Table 4 which sum-
marizes the revelation game played in stage 2 when the AA caught both firms colluding
in A in stage 1. The outcome (SB, SB) is the unique NE only if qB > ΠB−FAΠB+FB = q˜
US
B .
Second, given that F2 reported the cartel A in stage 1, the payoff matrix in Table 5
summarizes the revelation game played in market B in stage 2. In this case, Amnesty
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↓ F1, F2 → S NS
S
2ΠN − 12(FA + FB)
2ΠN − 12(FA + FB)
2ΠN
2ΠN − FA − FB
NS
2ΠN − FA − FB
2ΠN
ΠN − FA + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
ΠN − FA + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
Table 4: Stage 2 US Revelation Game after (NSANSB, NSANSB) in Stage 1
Plus strengthens F1’s incentives to report the cartel in B and as whether the cartel is
convicted depends only on the incentives for at least one firm revealing, the relevant
critical investigation probability is associated with the non-reporting condition for F1.
Again, the outcome (SB, SB) is the unique NE only if qB > ΠB−FAΠB+FB = q˜
US
B .
↓ F1, F2 → S NS
S
2ΠN − 12(FA + FB)
2ΠN − 12FB
2ΠN
2ΠN − FB
NS
2ΠN − FB − FA
2ΠN
ΠN − FA + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
ΠN + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
Table 5: Stage 2 US Revelation Game after (NSANSB, SANSB) in Stage 1
Finally, the payoff matrix in Table 6 summarizes the revelation game played in market
A in stage 2 when F2 reported the cartel B in stage 1. By reporting the cartel in
A, F1 may benefit from Amnesty Plus and thus, the relevant threshold is associated
with F1’s deviation incentives. Hence, the outcome (SA, SA) is the unique NE only if
qA >
ΠA−FB
ΠA+FA
= q˜USA .
↓ F1, F2 → S NS
S
2ΠN − 12(FA + FB)
2ΠN − 12FA
2ΠN
2ΠN − FA
NS
2ΠN − FB − FA
2ΠN
ΠN − FB + qA(ΠN − FA) + (1− qA)ΠA
ΠN + qA(ΠN − FA) + (1− qA)ΠA
Table 6: Stage 2 US Revelation Game after (NSANSB, NSASB) in Stage 1
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All US probability thresholds are unambiguously lower than their counterparts in
Europe. They decrease even further when the size of the fine a firm can avoid under
Amnesty Plus increases.
5 Reporting Decision in Stage 1
When firms simultaneously decide whether and, if yes, which of the cartels to report in
stage 1, they anticipate the NE played in stage 2. Figures 4 and 5 show firms’ reporting
decisions in the EU and the US. We identify four different regions common to the EU and
the US. In the US, however, there are four more areas which do not exist under the EC
Leniency Program. Each region corresponds to a particular combination of revelation
choices in stage 1 and stage 2. Hatched regions indicate that, if the game reaches stage
2, firms report cartel in B.
-
6
1 : NSANSB
2 : SANSB 3 : SASB
4 : NSASB
qA
q˜EUA
q˜EUB
qB
1
10
Figure 4: Stage 1 Reporting Decisions in the EU
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1 : NSANSB
2 : SANSB
3 : SASB
8 : SASB
7 : NSANSB
4 : NSASB
5 : NSANSB
qA
q˜EUA
q˜USA
q˜EUBq˜
US
B
qB
1
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6 : SASB
ﬀ
?
PP
PP
qˆB
qˆB
Figure 5: Stage 1 Reporting Decisions in the US
Region 1. Not Reporting of A and B: qB < q˜EUB and qA < q˜
EU
A
Conviction probabilities fall below the EU thresholds, and expected cartel profits
are positive in both markets. Thus, in the EU, conjectured investigation probabil-
ities are too small to induce self-reporting. Firms neither report any of the cartels
in stage 1, nor reconsider their decision to report the cartel in B in stage 2 after
the AA has detected the cartel in A.
In the US, there are two different cases: First, assume the conviction probability
in B falls between the US and the EU thresholds. Firms anticipate that after
a conviction in market A, they report the cartel in B. Second, assume that the
conviction probability in B is lower than the US threshold. Then, even in the US,
firms do not have any incentives to report the cartel in B after the detection of
A in stage 1. In both cases, expected cartel profits in each of the markets are
positive, and thus, firms have no incentives to report any of the cartels in stage 1.
Region 2. Revelation of Only A: qB < q˜USB and qA > q˜
EU
A
The probability of conviction in A is above the EU threshold. The expected cartel
profits in this market are negative. In the EU, firms report the cartel in A in stage
1. The reporting in A does not alter firms’ whistle blowing incentives in B. As the
probability of detection in B falls below the critical level in the US, reporting in A
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does not entail reporting in B. Thus, firms in the US only report the unprofitable
cartel A in stage 1.
Region 3. Revelation of A and B: qB > q˜EUB and qA > q˜
EU
A
Conviction probabilities in both markets exceed the EU thresholds. Thus, firms
do not find their cartels profitable on average. Consequently, in the EU as well as
in the US, they report both cartels in stage 1. The AA convicts both cartels and
grants amnesty to the first reporting firm. The other firm pays the full fine. The
game does not reach stage 2.
Region 4. Revelation of Only B: qB > q˜EUB and qA < q˜
US
A
Firms find detection in market B likely enough to make expected cartel profits
negative, and thus, they would report the cartel in B in stage 1 under both policies.
As the probability of detection in A falls below the critical level in the US, self-
reporting in B does not entail reporting of the cartel in A in stage 2.
Regions 5&6. Revelation of both or none: qB > q˜EUB and q˜
US
A < qA < q˜
EU
A
Regions 5 and 6 only exist in the US. In the EU, region 4 accounts for this case
where both firms simultaneously report the cartel in B in stage 1 but continue
colluding in A. Since the cartel in B gives negative expected profits, firms in the
US would like to mimic their European counterparts and report the cartel in B
in stage 1. However, firms in the US know that reporting in B in stage 1 entails
reporting of the cartel in A in stage 2. Cartel A is profitable though, and firms
are reluctant to report it which leaves them with two possible strategies: Either
denounce both cartels in stage 1 or do not report at all in that stage and reveal
the cartel in B in stage 2 only if the AA discovered the cartel in A by its mere
efforts. By reporting both cartels in stage 1, a firm would try to get in with the
amnesty application before its partner does, knowing that the cartel in A would be
at latest disclosed in stage 2 under Amnesty Plus. Nevertheless, the maintenance
of collusion in B may be, if not in market B taken individually, at least in markets
A and B jointly beneficial because, by means of cooperation in B, firms can sustain
the cartel in A. To determine which of the two strategies firms would choose, we
locate the (qA, qB)-space where they find it profitable to switch from NSANSB to
SASB
13. If firms do not report any of the cartels in stage 1, two possible states
can occur: First, with probability qA, the AA discovers the profitable cartel in A,
and firms rush to report the unprofitable cartel in B in order to save the fine in
13The best possible deviation from NSANSB is SASB . From a deviation to NSASB the deviating firm
gets 2ΠN − 12FA < 2ΠN because, after reporting in B, firms would simultaneously apply for Amnesty
Plus in stage 2. A deviation to SANSB is clearly not optimal because this means reporting the profitable
market and keeping the unprofitable one.
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A14. Second, with probability 1− qA, the AA does not find the cartel in A, stage 2
is not reached, and the cartel in B is detected with probability qB. The expected
profits from SASB are higher than those from NSANSB if
qA
[
2ΠN − 12(FA + FB)
]
+ (1− qA)
[
ΠA + qB(ΠN − FB) + (1− qB)ΠB
]
< 2ΠN
Setting ΠN = 0, this is equivalent to
qB >
ΠA +ΠB
ΠB + FB
− 1
2
qA
(1− qA)
(FA + FB)
(ΠB + FB)
= qˆB
The above condition states that, if, for a given qA, the AA is likely to detect the
cartel in B, expected profits in this market are very negative, and firms find it too
costly to sustain the cartel in B solely to preserve the cartel in A. This is what
happens in region 6. There, Amnesty Plus has a desirable effect: Firms report
both cartels in stage 1 whereas only one of them would have been reported in
the EU. Moreover, qˆB decreases and is concave in qA which indicates that, the
higher the probability the AA detects the cartel in A, the lower the probability of
detection needed in B in order to induce reporting of both cartels in stage 1. On
the contrary, if the conviction probability in B is too low, i.e. qB ≤ qˆB, Amnesty
Plus is detrimental since it invigorates collusion in both markets whereas one cartel
would have at least been reported under the EC Leniency Program. This situation
corresponds to region 5.
Regions 7&8. Revelation of both or none: q˜USB < qB < q˜
EU
B and qA > q˜
EU
A
Regions 7 and 8 only exist in the US. In the EU, this case falls in region 2. In market
A, conviction is sufficiently likely to make expected cartel profits negative. As a
consequence, firms would like to report the cartel in A while preserving positive
expected cartel profits in B. In the US, however, firms anticipate that, if they
report the cartel in A in stage 1, they will have to sacrifice their cartel profits in
B in stage 2. Therefore, firms’ optimal strategy would be either to immediately
disclose both cartels or not to report at all. By keeping secret the cartel in A firms
are able to sustain the cartel in B. Firms deviate from NSANSB to SASB if their
expected profits from the latter option are higher. The condition is the same as
above and thus, if qB ≤ qˆB, firms play NSANSB rather than SASB in stage 1.
This corresponds to regions 7 and 8 respectively.
14Then each of the firms can get Amnesty Plus with 50% chance and thus pays no fine, respectively
both fines in 50% of the cases.
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6 Penalty Plus
Penalty Plus severely punishes firms which are caught colluding in stage 2 after a cartel
conviction in stage 1 by increasing the fine to (1 + α)FA, respectively (1 + α)FB. As a
consequence, expected profits from cartel behavior in stage 2 decrease and thus, Penalty
Plus reinforces the beneficial effect of Amnesty Plus in this stage. The fear of harsher
fines further lower the probability threshold above which the (S, S) outcome is the unique
NE. Figure 6 shows the thresholds after the inclusion of Penalty Plus and compares the
situation to the EU and the US with only Amnesty Plus.
-
EU
NS S
qA, qB
US(AP&PP) US(AP)
q˜USA , q˜
US
B
S∗S∗∗
Figure 6: Stage 2 Reporting Decisions in the US, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
Penalty Plus enlarges the probability range for which firms report the second in-
fringement in stage 2 by S∗∗ at the expense of the zone where (NS,NS) is the Pareto
dominating NE. Arrows indicate this shift in Figure 5. To determine the relevant thresh-
olds, we substitute FB for (1+α)FB in the payoffs of Tables 4 and 5 and FA for (1+α)FA
in Table 6 and compute the probabilities for which a unilateral deviation is just un-
profitable. We find that the critical probabilities decrease to ΠB−FAΠB+(1+α)FB = q˜
US
B and
ΠA−FB
ΠA+(1+α)FA
= q˜USA after a conviction in market A and B respectively.
Penalty Plus also has a direct impact on firms’ revelation incentives in stage 1 by
increasing the expected fines when firms decide not to report at all. If the AA detects
the cartel in A, firms would simultaneously apply for Amnesty Plus in market B. Each
firm has a 50% chance to get the Plus in A and amnesty in B. The latecomer pays
a higher fine under Penalty Plus. Thus, the threshold above which firms report both
cartels already in stage 1 decreases to
ΠA +ΠB
ΠB + FB
− 1
2
qA
(1− qA)
(FA + (1 + α)FB)
(ΠB + FB)
= qˆB
Ceteris paribus, for a given qA, the probability of detection in B needed in order to
induce immediate self-reporting already in stage 1 is lower than under Amnesty Plus
alone. However, due to the decrease of the threshold in stage 2, the region where the
NSANSB outcome happens may eventually be larger.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the effect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the
incentives for companies, simultaneously engaged in multiple cartel activities, to reveal
the whole extent of their antitrust offenses.
Our results have confirmed the intuition that Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus enhance
firms’ incentives to report a cartel once they have been convicted for another illegal
cartel agreement. However, we have shown that Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have
an ambiguous impact on firms’ incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place. On the
one hand, firms, anticipating their rival’s action in stage 2, are less willing to denounce
a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC Leniency Program, if this move would entail
revelation of the second cartel. Thus, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain
collusion in both markets, especially if the second cartel gives firms high expected profits.
On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may lead to immediate self-reporting
in both markets. This outcome arises if a firm, fearing that, after reporting one, their
partner may be first to reveal the other cartel, prefers to immediately report both cartels.
In order for this desirable effect to occur, expected cartel profits in one market must be
insufficient to compensate for forgoing leniency in the other market. Which of the effects
prevails depends on the AA’s enforcement policy.
Our analysis stresses an essential issue in leniency policy. Further research has to
be done to embed this model in a dynamic framework taking into account the ongoing
nature of the relationship between cartel members. Moreover, having understood the
impact of the strategic linkages between markets generated by Amnesty Plus and Penalty
Plus on firms’ decisions in the revelation stage of the game, the effect on cartel formation
remains to be explored.
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